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Abstract 
Provider payment systems for mental health care that incentivise cost control and quality 
improvement have been a policy focus in a number of countries. In England, a new prospective 
provider payment system is being introduced to mental health that should encourage providers 
to control costs and improve outcomes. The aim of this research is to investigate the 
relationship between costs and outcomes to ascertain whether there is a trade-off between 
controlling costs and improving outcomes. 
The main data source is the Mental Health Minimum Data Set (MHMDS) for the years 2011/12 
and 2012/13.  Costs are calculated using NHS Reference Cost data while outcomes are 
measured using the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS). We estimate a bivariate 
multi-level model with costs and outcomes simultaneously. We calculate the correlation and 
plot the pairwise relationship between residual costs and outcomes at the provider level. 
After controlling for a range of demographic, need, social and treatment variables, residual 
variation in costs and outcomes remains at the provider level. The correlation between residual 
costs and outcomes is negative, but very small suggesting that cost-containment efforts by 
providers should not undermine outcome-improving efforts under the new payment system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Provider payment systems for mental health care that incentivise both cost control and quality 
improvement have been a policy focus in a number of countries. In the Netherlands, psychiatric 
care is included in the prospective activity-based payment system for inpatient and outpatient 
care [1]. Cost control is incentivised by nationally agreed unit prices and the system also 
incentivises quality improvements that reduce resource consumption [2]. In the US, psychiatric 
inpatient care provided under Medicare is reimbursed using a prospective per diem payment 
system that links payment to average cost in order to promote efficiency. The system employs 
variable per diem payments with higher payments at the beginning of the inpatient stay to 
reflect higher cost. The payment system is also designed to prevent adverse effects on quality 
of care by reimbursing readmissions within a short period of time at the per diem rate that was 
applied at the time of discharge [3].  
In England, mental health services have historically been funded through block contracts that 
do not necessarily incentivise providers to control cost [4] nor has payment been aligned to 
patient outcomes [5]. The prospective activity-based system used in the acute physical health 
care sector – the National Tariff Payment System (NTPS) – has recently been introduced to 
mental health.  A new classification system has been developed for mental health with a 
primary focus on patient need and severity, an important predictor of mental health resource 
use [6]. The currencies or units of activity for which payment will be made are 21 care clusters 
that are independent of care setting. Users of mental health care services are allocated to a care 
cluster by clinicians using the Mental Health Clustering Tool (MHCT). The MHCT 
incorporates items from the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS) [7] and the 
Summary of Assessments of Risk and Need (SARN) [8]. HoNOS is comprised of 12 items, 
each scored from 0 (no problem) to 4 (severe problem) giving a total score ranging from 0 
(best) to 48 (worst). Ratings are made by an individual clinician (psychiatrist, nurse, 
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psychologist, or social worker) or are based on a team rating. The rating is made on the basis 
of all information available to the clinician and is based on the most severe problem that arose 
during the two weeks leading up to the point of rating. 
After a patient is allocated to a care cluster, they should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure 
that the care cluster continues to meet their needs. The time between care cluster assessments 
or cluster review periods (CRPs) forms the basis of contracts and prices agreed between 
providers and commissioners (responsible for the organisation and purchase of mental health 
care for their populations) [9, 10]. The aspiration is that each care cluster will have a fixed 
national price or tariff [10]. This will provide an incentive to control costs as providers with 
costs above (below) the tariff will incur financial losses (surpluses). Quality of care and patient 
outcomes will also be incentivised under the new payment system with the inclusion of quality 
and outcome measures in provider contracts and the intention to link these to prices [11]. While 
the care cluster currencies cover most services for working age adults and older people, some 
services such as children and adolescent, drug and alcohol, and specialist mental health services 
are not included and will be reimbursed under separate non-cluster currencies [12].   
A small number of studies [13-16] have examined the relationship between costs and quality 
in mental health care with no clear consensus on whether a trade-off exists between the two. 
Previous studies investigating the relationship between costs and quality in both physical and 
mental health care have revealed that this is a challenging endeavour. Particular challenges 
relate to the availability of adequate measures of quality, small sample sizes and the 
endogenous relationship between costs and quality. Regarding the latter, a number of studies 
[17-19] have used instrumental variables in order to consistently estimate the causal 
relationship. Nevertheless other studies [20, 21] have highlighted the inherent difficulty of 
addressing endogeneity including the limited availability of suitable instrumental variables. 
Given the challenge of finding suitable instrumental variables, we avoid the causal 
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identification problem and motivated by the methodology used in studies that have assessed 
performance in physical health care [22, 23], we analyse costs and outcomes using two separate 
equations and allow for a correlation in responses.  As in previous studies [14, 21] we measure 
quality in terms of an outcome measure – the Health of the Nation Outcome Scale (HoNOS).  
Following earlier studies [18, 21-23] we use multi-level modelling which allows us to examine 
the correlation in residual responses at provider-level to provide insight into the relationship 
between costs and outcomes and whether a potential trade-off exists.  The use of a large, 
nationally representative dataset with individual-level data moves us beyond prior studies in 
mental health care that were constrained by aggregate data [15, 16] or small patient sample 
sizes [13, 14]. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between costs and outcomes for mental 
health providers in England to ascertain if incentives provided by the NTPS to control costs 
can be achieved without negatively affecting patient outcomes. We do not attempt to estimate 
the causal relationship between costs and outcomes; rather we estimate a multi-level bivariate 
model with costs and outcomes as responses. We calculate the correlation between the residual 
variation in costs and outcomes for providers, before and after controlling for a range of risk-
adjustment covariates encompassing socio-demographic, need and treatment variables. Our 
method also allows us to group providers according to their performance on residual costs and 
outcomes. 
 
We contribute to existing evidence in several ways.  This paper is the first to use a multi-level 
bivariate model to examine mental health cost and outcome responses simultaneously and 
calculate the correlation in residual variation between two responses.  We isolate the residual 
variation in costs and outcomes attributable to mental health providers in order to assess 
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provider performance. Moreover, while previous studies in mental health have used data with 
limited geographical or provider samples, we use a nationally-representative dataset that 
contains data for all specialist mental health providers in England.  This means that we can 
examine costs and quality for both admitted and non-admitted care and are not constrained to 
just one care setting as in previous studies. Finally, our findings provide a better understanding 
of the incentives introduced by the new payment system and whether a trade-off between cost 
containment and outcome improving efforts exists.  
 
2. METHODS 
The CRP forms the unit of observation in this analysis. As a patient can have more than one 
CRP we utilise a multi-level model to reflect CRPs nested within patients who are in turn nested 
within providers.   
We estimate the following bivariate model with two response variables for CRP i in patient j 
in provider k: cost y1ijk and outcome y2ijk: 
{
𝑦1ijk =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝑋1ijk +  𝑢1k +  𝑣1jk +  𝜀1ijk
 
𝑦2ijk =  𝛼2 +  𝛽2𝑋2ijk +  𝑢2k +  𝑣2jk +  𝜀2ijk
                  (1) 
    (
    
𝑢1𝑘  
𝑢2𝑘 
)∼ N (0, Ωu ) : (
𝜎2 𝑢1
     
𝜎𝑢1𝑢2 𝜎
2 𝑢2
  )                                    (2) 
X1ijk and X2ijk represent vectors of risk-adjustment covariates for the cost and outcome equations 
respectively.  The provider-level residual variance for costs and outcomes is represented by the 
random effects u1k and u2k respectively.  The patient-level residual variances for each response 
are denoted by v1jk and v2jk; while ε1ijk and ε2ijk signify the error terms at the CRP level for each 
response.  The provider-level residuals, u1k and u2k are both assumed to follow a bivariate 
normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix Ωu.  Our interest lies in the 
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correlation between the residual variation in y1ijk and y2ijk at the provider level which can be 
calculated as r(x,y) = 
𝜎𝑢1𝑢2 
√𝜎2 𝑢1
  𝜎2 𝑢2
   
 . We calculate this correlation for responses with and without 
risk-adjustment to gain an insight into the extent to which our risk-adjustment variables account 
for correlation between outcomes. 
Our cost response variable y1ijk is modelled using a log-linear model and our outcome response 
variable y2ijk using a linear model.  The multilevel estimates are statistically efficient even if 
some observations have missing data for either response under the assumption that data is 
missing at random [24].   
 
The coefficients for the cost response can be interpreted in terms of a percentage change in the 
geometric mean of cost.  For covariates measured as dummy variables, this is the percentage 
change in the geometric mean resulting from a change in the variable from zero to one which 
can be calculated as (exp(β) – 1)*100.  For continuous variables, the coefficient can be 
interpreted as the change in the geometric mean in cost resulting from a one unit change in this 
variable. The coefficients for the outcome response can be interpreted in terms of marginal 
effects; the change in this variable arising from a change in a binary independent variable from 
zero to one, and a one-unit change in continuous variables. 
 
The model is estimated using restrictive iterative generalised least squares (RIGLS) which is 
equivalent to restricted maximum likelihood [25] in MLwiN [24] using the runmlwin command 
[26] in Stata 13.0 [27]. 
 
We performed a sensitivity analysis by excluding a provider that is an outlier on the outcome 
response.  
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3. DATA 
3.1. Reference Cost data 
Reference Cost data is submitted by publicly owned providers to the Department of Health and 
reflects the costs of providing mental health services. Reference Cost data for mental health 
care is reported as per diem costs per care cluster for admitted and non-admitted care separately 
for each provider. The Reference Cost data was cleaned by omitting data for outliers defined 
as greater than 4 times the cost reported in the previous (for 2012/13 data) or following year 
(for 2011/12 data) (n=102,121). This resulted in dropping one provider with consistently high 
costs for all clusters across both years giving a sample size of 55 providers.  
To construct our cost response variable, we measured all activity during a CRP that 
corresponded to mental health services reimbursed under the care clusters. For each 
observation (CRP), we calculated the total number of days or length of stay in admitted and 
non-admitted care. These length of stay variables were then multiplied by the per diem unit 
costs for admitted and non-admitted care for the particular care cluster and provider in order to 
construct a variable reflecting the total cost associated with a CRP.  It is important to highlight 
that the use of cost data reported at a provider level, albeit disaggregated by cluster and 
admitted and non-admitted care will conceal the true variation in cost that would be evident in 
data reported at the patient level. We used the 2011/12 Reference Cost data for activity between 
1 April 2011 and 31 March 2012 and the 2012/13 Reference Cost data for activity between 1 
April 2012 and 31 March 2013.  For activity between 1 April 2011 and 31 March 2013 we 
calculated a weighted average cost that reflects the number of days during a CRP in each year.   
3.2. Mental Health Minimum Data Set (MHMDS) 
The MHMDS is a patient-level data set with national coverage for England. It is mandatory for 
providers of specialist, including elderly, mental health services funded by the NHS to submit 
MHMDS data on a quarterly and annual basis.  The MHMDS contains data on all the care and 
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treatment received by a service user irrespective of setting. We use Version 4.0 of the MHMDS, 
which covers 2011/12 and 2012/13 and includes information pertaining to the NTPS for mental 
health. As patients are not potentially identifiable from the data, and are not directly involved 
in the research, ethical approval was not required. The MHMDS data was cleaned to remove 
observations that: are duplicates; have age coded as less than 18 years or greater than 110 years, 
and are treated by private providers. We also dropped observations with inpatient days in the 
99th percentile for clusters 1 (Common mental health problems, low severity) and 2 (Common 
mental health problems) (n=833). Admission thresholds have increased [28-30] to the extent 
that patients are being admitted under the Mental Health Act (MHA) in order to access inpatient 
treatment [31]. Therefore, we would not expect patients in clusters 1 and 2 to receive long 
periods of inpatient treatment due to demand pressures on inpatient beds. 
 
HoNOS is routinely collected as part of the MHMDS, both as part of the MHCT and as an 
outcome measure. We use the total HoNOS score recorded as part of the MHCT at the end of 
a CRP (follow-up HoNOS) as our outcome response. Risk-adjustment covariates can vary for 
each response. The total HoNOS score recorded at the start (baseline) of a CRP is included as 
a risk-adjustment variable for the outcome response only as previous studies [32-35] show that 
baseline outcome is a consistent predictor of follow-up outcome. Risk-adjustment covariates 
for both responses cover demographic, treatment, need and social variables. Demographic 
variables include age, gender (with female as the reference category), ethnicity (White 
(reference category), Black, Asian and Other) and married/civil partner (with unmarried/no 
civil partner as the reference category).  Age is grouped into five categories reflecting quintiles 
of the distribution in order to capture any non-linearities in the relationship with cost and 
outcomes with age 18-34 years the reference category. Variables reflecting if a patient has care 
co-ordinated under the Care Programme Approach (CPA) (a method of assessing, planning and 
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reviewing the needs of a person with severe mental illness) or has been admitted to hospital 
under the Mental Health Act (MHA) provides information on severity and treatment. Missing 
values of CPA and MHA were coded as zero under the assumption that it is unlikely these 
observations were subject to the MHA or under CPA, given the high levels of scrutiny of these 
activities.  We include dummy variables for the 21 care clusters to investigate the extent to 
which these explain variations in costs and outcomes.  We use the cluster with the lowest cost 
(cluster 1 - common mental health problems, low severity) as the reference category. The 
MHMDS also contains data for a small area level geographic marker, the Lower Layer Super 
Output Area (LSOA) of the individual. LSOAs are a geographic hierarchy with a minimum 
population of 1000 and a mean of 1500 [36]. We matched LSOA codes in the MHMDS to data 
on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) Income Domain [37]. The IMD Income Domain 
measures the proportions of the population experiencing income deprivation in an area [37]. A 
higher score for the Income Domain indicates a greater proportion of the population in the area 
in which the patient lives experiences income deprivation. A dummy variable is included as a 
covariate for both responses in order to capture the year (2011/12 and 2012/13) in which the 
cluster commenced with 2011/12 as the reference category.   
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Response variables 
Figure 1 shows our cost response variable and figure 2 our outcome response variable measured 
at the CRP level.   
Insert Figure 1 around here 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
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The graphs show that both variables are approximately normally distributed although the 
outcome response variable is slightly right skewed reflecting a smaller number of observations 
with high follow-up HoNOS scores (and more severe mental health problems). 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Our estimation sample is 697,022 observations treated by 55 providers of which 269,525 
observations have both cost and outcome responses, 419,879 observations have the cost 
response only, and 7,618 have the outcome response only.  
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our estimation sample with reference categories 
in brackets.   
Insert Table 1 around here 
4.3. Estimation results 
Table 2 displays the estimation results.  All variables are statistically significant with the 
exception of Other ethnicity and cluster 11 (ongoing recurrent psychosis, low symptoms) for 
the total follow-up HoNOS dependent variable. 
Insert Table 2 around here 
For the log of total cost response variable, many of the cluster variables are associated with the 
largest effects. For example, cluster 14 (psychotic crisis) is associated with a 647% and cluster 
17 (psychosis and affective disorder difficult to engage) a 555% increase in cost compared to 
cluster 1 (common mental health problems, low severity). Other clusters associated with 
psychosis (clusters 10, 13 and 15) are also associated with considerable increases of over 400% 
compared to cluster 1. CRPs that have an admission under the MHA variable are associated 
with a 98% increase in cost. In terms of demographic variables, Black ethnicity is associated 
with an increase of 9% in costs compared to White ethnicity while age of 63-79 years is 
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associated with an increase in costs of 34% compared to age 18-34 years. CRPs that started in 
2012/13 are associated with a 39% reduction in costs compared to CRPs that started in 2011/12.  
Unit costs for non-admitted care reported by providers fell from 2011/12 to 2012/13 and we 
believe this is driving the negative association between Total Cost and CRPs that started in 
2012/13. 
For the follow-up HoNOS response variable, a positive coefficient signifies a worse outcome. 
Covariates associated with an improved outcome include being married or having a civil 
partner, Asian and Black ethnicities compared to White ethnicity, and older age.  Marriage/civil 
partnership and age 80 years or over are associated with a reduced HoNOS score of around 0.4 
points while Black ethnicity is associated with a reduction of 0.3 points. The MHA and CPA 
variables are associated with an increase in the follow-up HoNOS score of 0.4-0.5 points.  
Similar to the cost response, the clusters with higher severity are associated with greater 
magnitudes of effects. Compared to cluster 1 (common mental health problems, low severity) 
cluster 15 (severe psychotic depression) and cluster 16 (dual diagnosis, substance abuse and 
mental illness) are associated with an increase of 3.6 points and 3.9 points respectively. Clusters 
for cognitive impairment or dementia are associated with an increase of 4.4 points (cluster 20 
– cognitive impairment or dementia, high need) and 5.5 points (cluster 21 – cognitive 
impairment or dementia, high physical need) compared to cluster 1.  A CRP that started in 
2012/13 is associated with an increased HoNOS score of around 0.2 points. 
4.4. Residual variation in provider costs and outcomes 
The correlation between residual costs and outcomes at the provider level was calculated as -
0.004 for unadjusted outcomes and -0.02 for risk-adjusted outcomes suggesting little evidence 
of a meaningful relationship between the two variables. 
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Figure 3 shows the pairwise plot in risk-adjusted residual costs and outcomes for the providers 
in our analysis.   
Insert Figure 3 around here 
The providers fit quite evenly into four groups; those associated with 1) higher costs and lower 
follow-up HoNOS scores (better outcome) in the top left quadrant, 2) higher costs and higher 
follow-up HoNOS scores (worse outcome) in the top right quadrant, 3) lower costs and higher 
follow-up HoNOS scores (worse outcome) in the bottom right quadrant, and 4) lower costs and 
lower follow-up HoNOS scores (better outcome) in the bottom left quadrant.                                            
There is an outlier provider with a residual follow-up HoNOS score of just over 4 points above 
the average and slightly above-average residual costs.  Compared to the average, this outlier 
provider has higher than average baseline and follow-up HoNOS scores, and higher than 
average proportions of observations of White ethnicity; in the older age groups (63-79 years 
and 80 years and over); under CPA; in cognitive impairment or dementia clusters (clusters 18 
and 19); and with lower income deprivation. 
The estimates of risk-adjusted residual costs and outcomes at the provider level are normalised 
to have a mean of zero. The follow-up HoNOS response variable is measured on a continuous 
scale from 0 (best) to 48 (worst) meaning that a positive score for the residual total follow-up 
HoNOS score signifies a worse outcome. The best performer in relation to outcomes is 
associated with a risk-adjusted residual follow-up HoNOS score of 1.36 less than the average 
performer while the worst performer is associated with a risk-adjusted residual follow-up 
HoNOS score of 4.23 greater than the average performer. The estimates of residual Total Cost 
can be interpreted as percentage increases or decreases in the geometric mean of Total Cost 
compared to the average as calculated as (exp (EB estimate) – 1)*100. The best performing 
provider in relation to risk-adjusted residual Total Cost is associated with a Total Cost that is 
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71% lower than the average performing provider while the worst performing provider in 
relation to risk-adjusted residual Total Cost is associated with a Total Cost that is 194% higher 
than the average performing provider. 
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
The exclusion of the provider with the above-average risk-adjusted residual follow-up HoNOS 
score of 4.23 decreased the estimation sample to 681,305 observations.  The estimation results 
were robust to this change.  The correlation between risk-adjusted residual costs and outcomes 
at the provider level became -0.09. Figure 4 displays the pairwise plot in residual costs and 
outcomes for the 54 providers in the sensitivity analysis. The risk-adjusted residual follow-up 
HoNOS score reduced to 1.39 for the worst performing provider on follow-up HoNOS scores 
compared to the average performing provider for this response. There was also a small 
reduction regarding risk-adjusted residual Total Cost with the worst performing provider 
associated with a Total Cost that is 191% higher than the average performing provider. 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
5. DISCUSSION 
The reimbursement of mental health care providers in England is undergoing a considerable 
reform with the introduction of a prospective, activity-based payment system. From April 2017, 
all mental health providers and commissioners are required to link payment to locally agreed 
quality and outcome measures [11] and some local health economies have already developed 
outcome measures and indicators for payment purposes [38]. The new system will offer 
incentives for providers to deliver care more efficiently while better meeting patient needs and 
improving outcomes. This research has explored the relationship between mental health costs 
and outcomes in order to examine the scope for providers to respond to the incentives 
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introduced by the new payment system and makes an important contribution to the limited 
literature for mental health care. 
Prior to risk-adjustment, we find evidence of a very small negative correlation between costs 
and outcomes at the provider-level. After controlling for a range of demographic, need, social 
and treatment factors, we find that residual variation remains in both costs and outcomes at the 
provider level. However, the correlation between residual costs and outcomes at the provider 
level is miniscule, which suggests that a trade-off between cost containment and outcome 
improving efforts on the part of providers is not a major concern in our data. Plotting the 
provider-level residual costs and outcome response variables reveals that providers broadly fall 
into four groups with an outlier provider. Providers with higher than average residual costs and 
higher than average residual follow-up HoNOS scores (worse outcome) may signify poor 
performance but may also indicate that certain providers are treating a case-mix that our model 
has not fully accounted for. While patient case mix is controlled for to a certain extent by the 
care clusters, the clustering method does not explicitly take diagnosis into account and it is 
likely that the clusters are very variable in terms of diagnosis and case mix [4, 39]. It may also 
be the case that some patients have treatment-resistant variants of mental illness which implies 
that they will be consuming large amounts of care and resources with little discernible changes 
in outcome scores [40]. If certain providers have a higher case-load of such patients this could 
well explain their unexplained higher costs and worse outcomes. If the higher costs are 
legitimate then these providers may warrant additional payments as defined by any outlier 
policy attached to the payment system. A number of providers are associated with lower 
residual follow-up HoNOS scores (better outcome) but also with higher residual costs. These 
providers in particular may face a potential trade-off between costs and outcomes and efforts 
to reduce costs under a national tariff may compromise outcomes if providers are induced to 
undertake undesirable behaviours such as skimping on patient care. A number of providers 
15 
 
have lower than average residual costs and lower than average residual follow-up HoNOS 
scores (better outcome).  These providers are likely to benefit financially from the new payment 
system if a national tariff is introduced and patient outcomes are linked to provider payment.  
Providers with lower than average residual costs and higher than average residual follow-up 
HoNOS scores (worse outcome) may have scope to make financial profits under a national 
tariff but these may be offset if payment is linked to outcomes. If providers are achieving lower 
costs at the expense of patient outcomes then they would warrant particular scrutiny by 
commissioners under quality and outcomes standards established in the contracting process. 
It is important to highlight a number of limitations regarding the data we use. Concerns have 
been raised regarding the quality of mental health Reference Cost data in particular in relation 
to variations in unit costs within clusters and between providers as well as issues around 
missing data [41]. A further limitation of the cost data used is that it is essentially provider-
level cost data that underpins our dependent cost variable. While variation in the dependent 
cost variable will arise for patients in different clusters with different care patterns, a greater 
level of variation would be observed if we had access to data on the actual costs incurred by 
individual patients, rather than the provider average. While the MHMDS contains variables on 
primary and secondary diagnoses, poor coding of this data inhibited inclusion of diagnosis in 
our set of risk-adjustment variables. A further data limitation is the missing data for follow-up 
HoNOS scores. We assume that this data is missing at random but this assumption would not 
hold if, for example, patients with more severe mental health problems are more likely to drop 
out of care and not have a follow-up HoNOS score recorded. Due to the poor coding of 
diagnosis data we are unable to investigate this hypothesis. Despite these data limitations, this 
research provides a valuable insight into the relationship between mental health costs and 
outcomes that is pertinent in the context of prospective activity-based payment. Our data show 
no evidence of a strong relationship between costs and outcomes. This provides some 
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reassurance that outcome improvements can be obtained without spending a lot more, or, 
conversely, that some savings are possible. The research will be useful to commissioners of 
mental health services by providing an indication of how providers perform on disparate 
objectives. This work also benefits policymakers in planning future refinements to the payment 
system.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total cost 689404 3448.076 9783.937 
log of total cost 689404 6.919 1.615 
Total HoNOS follow-up score  277143 11 6 
Total HoNOS baseline score 277143 11 6 
Married/civil partner [Unmarried/ 
no civil partner] 697022 0.331 0.470 
[White ethnicity]  697022 0.877 0.329 
Asian ethnicity 697022 0.046 0.208 
Black ethnicity 697022 0.047 0.211 
Other ethnicity 697022 0.031 0.173 
[Age category 1 (18-34)]  697022 0.204 0.403 
Age category 2 (35-46) 697022 0.191 0.393 
Age category 3 (47-62) 697022 0.207 0.405 
Age category 4 (63-79) 697022 0.204 0.403 
Age category 5 (80+) 697022 0.194 0.395 
Gender [Female] 697022 0.436 0.496 
Admitted under the MHA 697022 0.088 0.283 
Under CPA 697022 0.413 0.492 
Cluster 0: Variance 697022 0.011 0.103 
[Cluster 1: Common mental 
health problems, low severity] 697022 0.039 0.195 
Cluster 2: Common mental health 
problems 697022 0.050 0.219 
Cluster 3: Nonpsychotic, 
moderate severity 697022 0.116 0.321 
Cluster 4: Non-psychotic, severe 697022 0.088 0.283 
Cluster 5: Non-psychotic, very 
severe 697022 0.032 0.175 
Cluster 6: Non-psychotic 
disorders of overvalued ideas 697022 0.017 0.128 
Cluster 7: Enduring non-
psychotic disorders 697022 0.039 0.193 
Cluster 8: Non-psychotic chaotic 
and challenging disorders 697022 0.036 0.186 
Cluster 10: First episode in 
psychosis 697022 0.027 0.163 
Cluster 11: Ongoing recurrent 
psychosis, low symptoms 697022 0.090 0.286 
Cluster 12: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high disability 697022 0.064 0.246 
Cluster 13: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high 
symptom/disability 697022 0.046 0.209 
Cluster 14: Psychotic crisis 697022 0.029 0.167 
Cluster 15: Severe psychotic 
depression 697022 0.010 0.102 
Cluster 16: Dual diagnosis, 
substance abuse and mental 
illness 697022 0.016 0.127 
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Cluster 17: Psychosis and 
affective disorder difficult to 
engage 697022 0.022 0.148 
Cluster 18: Cognitive impairment, 
low need 697022 0.098 0.297 
Cluster 19: Cognitive impairment 
or dementia, moderate need 697022 0.107 0.310 
Cluster 20: Cognitive impairment 
or dementia, high need 697022 0.043 0.204 
Cluster 21: Cognitive impairment 
or dementia, high physical need 697022 0.019 0.135 
Income Deprivation 697022 17.988 11.785 
CRP started in 2012/13 [CRP 
started in 2011/12] 697022 0.423 0.494 
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Table 2. Estimation Results 
  Observations per group 
  Number of 
observations Minimum Average Maximum 
Level 3: Provider 55 33 12673 54090 
Level 2: Person 414092 1 1.7 43 
Level 1: CRP 697022       
Log likelihood -2065741    
  Log of total cost Total follow-up HoNOS  
  
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Total HoNOS baseline score   0.388 0.002*** 
Married/civil partner 0.009 0.004* -0.378 0.025*** 
Asian ethnicity 0.026 0.009** -0.121 0.057* 
Black ethnicity 0.083 0.010*** -0.302 0.063*** 
Other ethnicity 0.031 0.011** -0.050 0.070 
Age category 2 (35-46) 0.086 0.006*** 0.191 0.037*** 
Age category 3 (47-62) 0.147 0.006*** 0.169 0.036*** 
Age category 4 (63-79) 0.295 0.007*** -0.338 0.041*** 
Age category 5 (80+) 0.181 0.008*** -0.401 0.048*** 
Gender 0.011 0.004** 0.236 0.023*** 
Admitted under the MHA 0.681 0.008*** 0.484 0.042*** 
Under CPA 0.231 0.005*** 0.407 0.026*** 
Cluster 0: Variance 0.286 0.019*** 1.094 0.128*** 
Cluster 2: Common mental health 
problems 
0.378 0.012*** 0.539 0.084*** 
Cluster 3: Nonpsychotic, moderate 
severity 
0.686 0.010*** 1.262 0.075*** 
Cluster 4: Non-psychotic, severe 1.019 0.011*** 2.232 0.076*** 
Cluster 5: Non-psychotic, very severe 1.323 0.013*** 3.129 0.087*** 
Cluster 6: Non-psychotic disorders of 
overvalued ideas 
1.284 0.016*** 3.003 0.102*** 
Cluster 7: Enduring non-psychotic 
disorders 
1.280 0.013*** 2.995 0.085*** 
Cluster 8: Non-psychotic chaotic and 
challenging disorders 
1.347 0.013*** 3.390 0.087*** 
Cluster 10: First episode in psychosis 1.684 0.014*** 1.550 0.092*** 
Cluster 11: Ongoing recurrent 
psychosis, low symptoms 
1.035 0.011*** 0.125 0.076 
Cluster 12: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high disability 
1.468 0.012*** 1.833 0.078*** 
Cluster 13: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high symptom/disability 
1.720 0.013*** 3.020 0.083*** 
Cluster 14: Psychotic crisis 2.011 0.014*** 3.412 0.089*** 
Cluster 15: Severe psychotic 
depression 
1.626 0.020*** 3.562 0.118*** 
Cluster 16: Dual diagnosis, substance 
abuse and mental illness 
1.528 0.017*** 3.871 0.103*** 
Cluster 17: Psychosis and affective 
disorder difficult to engage 
1.880 0.015*** 3.373 0.095*** 
Cluster 18: Cognitive impairment, low 
need 
0.186 0.011*** 0.385 0.079*** 
Cluster 19: Cognitive impairment or 
dementia, moderate need 
0.550 0.011*** 2.310 0.079*** 
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Cluster 20: Cognitive impairment or 
dementia, high need 
0.808 0.013*** 4.354 0.089*** 
Cluster 21: Cognitive impairment or 
dementia, high physical need 
0.681 0.016*** 5.462 0.113*** 
Income Deprivation 0.000 0.000* 0.014 0.001*** 
CRP started in 2012/13 -0.494 0.004*** 0.195 0.020*** 
Constant 5.934 0.057*** 4.648 0.148*** 
Random Effects Parameters Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Level 3: Provider     
Variance: Log of total cost 0.170 0.033 0.106 0.234 
Variance: Follow-up total HoNOS 0.748 0.052 -0.109 0.095 
Covariance: Log of total cost, Follow-
up total HoNOS 
-0.007 0.159 0.436 1.060 
Level 2: Person     
Variance: Log of total cost 0.291 0.004 0.284 0.298 
Variance: Follow-up total HoNOS 5.407 0.013 0.038 0.089 
Covariance: Log of total cost, Follow-
up total HoNOS 
0.063 0.073 5.263 5.551 
Level 1: CRP     
Variance: Log of total cost 1.768 0.004 1.760 1.776 
Variance: Follow-up total HoNOS 21.000 0.015 -0.078 -0.017 
Covariance: Log of total cost, Follow-
up total HoNOS 
0.047 0.078 20.848 21.153 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Figure 1. Log of Total Cost 
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Figure 2. Total follow-up HoNOS score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Figure 3. Pairwise plot of residual costs and outcomes for providers 
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Figure 4. Pairwise plot of residual costs and outcomes for providers for sensitivity 
analysis 
 
 
